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PROF. COOPER: This panel deals with inadvertent privilege
waiver through the production of documents-or perhaps something
else-that include privileged information.
The topic of inadvertent privilege waiver is one that spans both
electronic production and of course paper production. It is a topic
that first was brought at least to my attention in an earlier discovery
conference that the Committee held at Boston College Law, now
quite some years ago, as people started to talk about it. My reaction
as a total innocent-and that's a nice word for saying totally ignorant
of these problems-was: I don't believe it! What are you telling me
courts do? You inadvertently turn over one thing that is not on its
face obviously privileged, you did not realize that it was in the chain of
a privileged communication, and the answer is that there is waiver of
all privilege with respect to the entire subject matter and that,
whatever you try to do among the parties to avoid that result, non* Thomas M. Cooley Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; Reporter,
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parties are not bound and you may have lost the privilege anyway? I
just don't believe it!
Well, I stand to be informed. The way we are going to offer it in
this panel, at least at the beginning, is going to be in essentially two
stages. First, a stage that is designed with the idea that this conference
is, among other things, a very important vehicle for informing the
Advisory Committee, and the Standing Committee beyond the
Advisory Committee, as to what is going on, what the problems are,
and how lawyers are reacting to them in fact. That will be essentially
the first stage. And then a second stage, looking at a number of
proposals that have been identified-I'm not sure how far any of them
have been developed, although some are actually implemented in
practice here or there-to consider how well they might work in
addressing these problems.
My hope is that as we go through these two stages the panel
discussion itself will become increasingly disorderly-that is, one of us
says something, someone else says, "Wait, wait a minute, I have a
different story to tell." We'll see how that goes.
So for the first question I am going to ask Jonathan Redgrave to
describe what it is that lawyers are so afraid of, why indeed this
problem of inadvertent privilege waiver through production of
something that ought not to have been produced raises such ripples of
fear as they go through the discovery process.
MR. REDGRAVE: Thanks.
The meeting started yesterday with Professor Marcus talking about
newness, the concept of newness, and I'm glad to say that we are
going to talk about something that is royal and ancientunfortunately, it's not golf-it's the idea of privilege. In many ways,
this is something that obviously has affected us in the paper world
forever.
So what is the driver of waiver concerns now and why should we
consider Rules changes?
Obviously, mistakes can and will happen in productions. They
happen in the paper world. They happen in the electronic world. The
consequences of those mistakes have always been governed by various
rules that come out of different jurisdictions, and of course have
different things.
There are three different tests: a strict, a lenient, and a middle-ofthe-road balancing test. That last one is the one that is in most
jurisdictions, but not all.
But in terms of these mistakes, what is going on out there in the real
practice? Professor Cooper says, "Is this really an issue and a
problem?" In many cases, both sides really sit down and they agree
on a protective order, a non-waiver order, a return order, which takes
care of this. So why do we really need to step in with Rules changes if
people are able to do that? Well, there are a number of reasons.
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First, just to those agreements and accommodations among parties,
those are not uniform and those are not universal. One could ask:
why should inexperienced counsel-or, more particularly, why should
a client, whose privilege it is anyway for the most part-not get the
benefit that experienced counsel may get through doing agreements
and protective orders entered by the court?
Secondly, the reality of the lowest common denominator comes into
play. What I mean by that is that you may have a jurisdiction, let's say
in the Northeast, where the parties agree and the judge enters an
order. But you may have a jurisdiction in some other part of the
country where the court there entertains a motion by a plaintiff that
says,
It was great that the parties up in the northeast had this agreement,
they had inadvertent waivers, they gave it back; but too bad, so sad,
the bell was rung. Another party who was not an owner or a party
to have privilege saw the document. It is lost. None of this mumbo
jumbo. Give it back. Pretend it didn't happen.
It's like putting a bag over the head of a child and saying the child is
not there. It's there, the person saw it, the waiver is exact, it is
unforgiving, and the document should be produced. And a judge in
the southeast or southwest says, "Okay, it's a waiver, I don't care what
that judge in the northeast says."
So that lowest common denominator is what drives law firms, it's
what drives corporate counsel, to say, "I've really got to spend a lot of
money to make sure I don't get privileged documents inadvertently
produced." Okay, so that drives cost.
Now, then we get to this electronic discovery world and the rule of
real estate, which is "location, location, location," but of course let's
change that to "volume, volume, volume." That is what we heard a
lot about yesterday, and it is very real. So you are increasing the
amount of information going out.
Now, electronic discovery is great because there are a lot of tools
you can apply to help you find the privileged documents, to try to
guard against inadvertent disclosures. But the reality is that with that
volume, large productions, you will still have mistakes, and if you
multiply those together you still have a big problem.
Which then drives us to: What do you do? Is there really a
problem in the law as far as this being litigated? Are people really
taking advantage of mistakes?
The answer is yes. I have seen and been involved in privileged
motions that deal with waiver documents both on the documents and
the subject matter; for privilege logs that say too little, for privilege
logs that say too much; for documents that were inadvertently
produced by my party, my client; and for documents that my client is

104

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

claiming privilege to as to which another party inadvertently produced
a copy of. I mean there are all sorts of variations.
And it is driven by the concept of zealous advocacy. There are a
number of bar opinions out there that tell lawyers in certain
jurisdictions if they were to get a privileged document and the other
side didn't take proper steps: "That's their problem. You have a duty
to your client in zealous advocacy to go out and use it."
There are also countervailing jurisdictions where the bar authorities
have put out ethics opinions that say: "You shouldn't be doing that.
You should be returning it."1
So there is a lot of variance out there among both the ethical boards
and the courts. So with that world of non-uniformity, with the
concerns about waiver and subject matter waiver driving in-house
counsel, and the volume, I think it is a good time to look at the issue it is very real-and say: Is there something that the Rules can do to
address it?
I will leave the "quick peek" and what is behind that to our second
discussion.
PROF. COOPER: Another part of the question, particularly for
electronic discovery, but more generally, again from my innocent
view, would have been something like this: Well, for heaven's sake,
when you are being asked to produce documents-to take the core
illustration of this-you are going to review them for relevance, you
are going to review them for confidentiality, for possible grounds for
seeking protective orders, a variety of things you are going to screen
for. Why is it that screening for a privilege waiver adds so much more
to the burden than you would have to undertake anyway? And then,
why is e-discovery somehow, if it is, something that increases the risk?
And then, surrounding that, something that Mary Sue Henifin said
yesterday, and that was, if you remember the exchange, "Well, yes"and I think it was meant to be more embedded data than metadata.
The embedded data in a document may itself reveal information that
is privileged in some sorts of litigation, some sorts of documents.
Which leads to the question: Has anybody ever thought if you are
going to be exchanging information in native format about screening
the embedded data-and, if it is possible, in metadata- for privilege?
Sheila, why does the privilege waiver thing augment the burden so
much?
MS. BIRNBAUM: Ed, as usual, has asked three questions in one.
He does that so well.
Let me just try to do the last one first, embedded data/metadata.
When all these young people are reviewing all these things, usually we
up until now have not given documents with the embedded data and
1. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382
(Jul. 5, 1994).
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metadata; we have usually given the .tiff image or the image that you
see on your computer. So if we were adding in any way the fact that
you had to hand over embedded data or metadata, I think then you
would increase the cost exponentially because that would have to all
be reviewed for privilege as well: Did that piece of document go to
the counsel's office at some point, did the counsel have input into
changing some of the language, and is that subject to work product or
attorney-client privilege?
So I think what you would have is a situation where now one of the
more expensive-or most expensive, in my opinion-parts of
discovery is the reviewing of these documents for privilege. That
would increase the cost exponentially.
Now what happens? When you're looking at relevancy, why are the
privilege aspects of this so important? When you're looking for
relevancy, it is pretty easy to determine whether it is relevant or not,
in the sense that you can look at certain computers or certain people's
servers or certain names and you can do the searches and that cuts
down on the relevancy. But if you give an irrelevant document, so
what? You know, it has no meaning in the process usually. So that's
not a very big problem and you can do that quite quickly, and if you
make a mistake it's no big deal.
But if you hand over a privileged document, it may be an important
privileged document or an unimportant document, but you can't do it,
because then I think you're setting yourself up for your client being
upset, possibly malpractice, and possibly creating this waiver problem
in many other places.
So I think more time is spent on the privilege issues. And it's not so
easy. It's not every document that says "privileged and confidential"
on the front of it. I mean you have to give people a whole list of all
the people, all the names of all of the lawyers in-house, all the lawyers
outside. There may be e-mail going back and forth. It is a very timeconsuming, difficult process, someone sitting with a bunch of namesyou know, does that name appear anywhere on the sheet of paper?
So I really do think that the time has come to really look at this
issue. The whole game it appears, one of the big games, of discovery
is "Gotcha!"-you know, "I got you, you made a mistake. I got this
attorney-client privileged document. I'm going to make a lot of hay
out of it one way or another."
As we'll talk about some of the solutions that states are considering
and operating under, I think it's that experiment that is going on in
the states that is very helpful, I think, for the Committee to examine
and see how they are working, and I think we are going to talk about
some of them.
But I think the problem is very real, it's one of the most expensive
parts of discovery, and it will only get worse as we get more and more
data that is going to have to be reviewed.
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PROF. COOPER: Another range of this phenomenon is captured
perhaps in a talk I had just a week ago at lunch with a now-senior New
York litigator, who asked what the Committee was up to. Ever alert
for a chance to learn something, I said, "Well gee, one of the things
we're talking about ...and what's your experience?"
His response was,
Well, I used to take a very hard line with privilege waiver. You gave
me something privileged and I kept it and I pushed for waiver with
respect to everything. Not so long ago, I had a case in which the
other side advertently produced a dozen privileged documents, and I
told the young people who were actually running the discovery,
"Good, let's keep them." They said, "Oh no, we can't do that. We
don't do that anymore. We have to give them back." I said, "Oh
well, okay." And then that turned out to be a good thing because
later on we inadvertently produced a dozen privileged documents
and we got them back. Maybe this isn't such a bad idea after all.
That opens up a question that is also touched on. The District of
New Jersey Local Rule 26.1(d)(3)(a) lists privileged waiver
protections among the topics for the 26(f) conference.2
What is actually going on out there? We have the horror story, the
great fear of waiver. Are lawyers actually insisting on this? What is
Are people in fact, by agreement or by simple
the practice?
understanding that this is the way we behave, returning privileged
things?
Joseph Saveri, what is going on?
MR. SAVERI: I think my experience has been generally that we
are moving past an era where we are trying to find an opportunity to
engage in, as Sheila says, a "Gotcha!" litigation. I think that from my
perspective-and I focus on antitrust cases and big document caseswe want to move cases as quickly as possible to resolution on the
merits. It is important for us, particularly when we deal with
electronic discovery, and it is also true with respect to the paper
discovery that I deal with, just because the volume is so big, that we
want to eliminate the transaction costs associated with discovery.
Consistent with what I think we heard yesterday, it is important to
get access to the relevant information and to begin as quickly as
possible to identify what sources of information there are, and
particularly with respect to electronic data, to know the nature and
the form of the information that is there.
One of the most frustrating parts about trying to achieve that is the
delay that is engendered, I think, in the process as a result of the
privilege review. The documents and the materials that-well, there
are really two things that happen. One, as a general matter, the whole
privilege review slows down the process. In fact, the privilege review I
2. D.N.J. Local Civ. R. 26.1(d)(3)(a).
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think delays the process as much as any single part of what the
defendants do in organizing their materials to turn over to the
plaintiffs.
So I am interested in doing anything to cut through that. If I can
get an agreement that we will not keep privileged materials, or if there
has been a disclosure we will turn them back, it seems to me one of
the easiest things for me to offer to expedite the process. My
experience has been as a plaintiffs' lawyer that we are more than
willing to do that to move the process along.
I come from California, where in fact I think I have an ethical
obligation that if I do find one of those documents I will turn them
over. And what's good for the goose is good for the gander, and
ultimately I think, because I am a repeat player, that if the same thing
happens to me, then I'll be afforded the same courtesy.
So I think generally my experience has been that we are being very
reasonable about not insisting on keeping the benefits of inadvertently
disclosed documents.
MS. BIRNBAUM: Can I just respond a minute to that?
I think there are two types of cases. There are the commercial cases
where you have two players who have lots of documents. In those
cases, it's very simple: people stipulate, because what's good for the
goose is good for the gander, and everybody wants to be on an even
playing field. Everyone got lots of documents. They want to cut
through and get some agreements. In those cases, you usually have a
stipulated approach to all of this. That seems to work pretty well.
You know, "I'm going to produce privileged documents, you're going
to produce them, we want to cut the costs, we both have documents."
In the kinds of cases that I am in-mass tort cases, products liability
cases-there is only one-sided discovery.
There are no real
documents that the plaintiff has, except medical records, and it's all
my records, it's all my documents. In certain places, in certain parts of
the country, there are not reasonable lawyers because they want to
make a case over the discovery because that is part of how they are
going to get the case to settle. If they make discovery expensive,
difficult, create sanctions problems, this is all part of the methodology
to get to the settlement.
And so there are different types of cases. The big commercial cases
are not a problem, in the sense that people will work it out. But the
rule can't necessarily be for those cases. It's for the case where it is a
problem, and it is continuing to be a problem, and it's going to
continue to be a bigger problem as we have more data. So I think you
have to keep that in mind.
And there are repeat players that, like Joseph, are going to play by
certain rules, and then there are many other people who are going to
play by no rules.
PROF. COOPER: Before turning to the range of questions, is

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

there some rules approach that might be effective, that ought to be
considered by the Advisory Committee and on up to the Enabling
Act 3 process?
One of the questions that is continually put is the question whether
those of the Rules dealing with privilege, however indirectly, however
tightly tied to the discovery process, are subject to the special
statutory provision that in a way qualifies the Enabling Act.4
It is set out in § 2074(b),5 which says that any rule "creating,
abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force
or effect unless approved by Act of Congress."
Now, this is a departure from the ordinary Enabling Act process,
and although it seems to me pretty clear that a rule dealing with
inadvertent privilege waiver is not a rule that either creates or
abolishes a privilege, it might well be seen as a rule modifying a
privilege. So you've got that question.
Then you have a rather broader question. Reporter Capra is ever
alert-indeed, sensitive-to the division of authority and subjects
between the Civil Rules and the Evidence Rules. It's an ongoing issue
with respect to some of the Discovery Rules that have provisions that
overlap and depart from the Evidence Rules at the same time. He is
sensitive to both of those things. I will ask him about that.
But I will also add a twist to it. I don't see Dan Coquillette here this
morning, so I will do his part of this responsibility. We have been
reminded that bar groups dealing with Rules of Professional
Responsibility are concerned about a duty either to exploit to the
maximum advantage anything they foolishly turn over to you, or
honorably and decently to return it to them. There is considerable
sensitivity about the overlap between Rules of Procedure and Rules
of Professional Responsibility, an overlap encountered rather more
often than I think we sometimes pause to reflect on. That is another
sensitivity.
Dan, is there anything we can do even if we want to?
PROF. CAPRA: Sheila, wasn't that just three questions again?
MS. BIRNBAUM: Yes.
PROF. COOPER: At least.
PROF. CAPRA: He added the third one with that twist.
MS. BIRNBAUM: He always does that.
PROF. CAPRA: Well, I proceed from what I contend to be two
unassailable positions.
The first one is that there are already too many evidence rules in
the Civil Rules because where you look for evidence rules is in the
Evidence Rules; you don't look for evidence rules in the Civil Rules.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2000).
4. Id.
5. Id. § 2074(b).
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It can only be a cause for confusion, misapplication. So I proceed
from that premise.
The second premise I proceed from is that it makes no sense to get
Congress involved in privilege work. The reason for that is when
Congress gets involved with privilege work they will be affected by
You'll have all sorts of lobbyists coming down on
lobbyists.
Washington and talking about various things. And even if it's in the
course of this very limited point of forfeiture, it will be pretty much a
disaster.
That is why the Evidence Rules Committee has never gone forth
with proposed rulemaking in this area, because of § 2074(b), and the
knowledge that once it gets up into Congress it's not your work
anymore. They don't benignly neglect it, they have to actually enact
it, and if they actually have to get up off their keesters and enact
something, it is going to be a disaster.
So in that respect I have just a couple of comments.
Would this rulemaking modify an evidentiary privilege? I don't see
how you can say it would not modify an evidentiary privilege. In
jurisdictions where forfeiture is automatic, it modifies the evidentiary
privilege. It means that the privilege can or cannot be asserted. What
more could that be than modification?
There are jurisdictions which have what was called "the easy rule,"
which is to say you always get it back, no matter how bad you were or
no matter how negligent you were. Well, any rule that you are going
to draft is going to modify that rule in those jurisdictions. To argue
that the waiver rule is somehow not a modification of the rule of
privilege itself-well, how could you address a privilege without
thinking about waiver issues? That's inherently related.
When the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules first proposed
rules on privilege, one of the rules that they proposed was a waiver
rule, and that was one of the rules that was rejected by Congress and
led to § 2074(b). So how can you say that that is not a matter of
concern that gave rise to the statute in the first place? I just cannot
see how it could not be modifying.
At any rate, it is not for me to answer that; it is for some court to
answer that once this rule gets passed and Congress isn't alerted to the
problem and then it becomes a part of a litigation. I don't know,
maybe ten or fifteen years later, you will actually have some
determination that this rule, which is intended to regulate and
basically provide some kind of concrete guidance for lawyers, will
actually be concrete. I guess I don't see how that works.
The next point I would like to make is that this rule, if it were in the
Civil Rules, would have to, I assume, be attendant to discovery. But
not all of the advertent disclosure problems occur in discovery. There
are missent faxes, there are letters sent to the wrong place, there is a
lawyer responding to e-mail and he hits "reply to all" instead of "reply
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to sender." That is an inadvertent disclosure of privileged information
that doesn't occur during discovery. What rule governs that? The
federal common law governs that, the federal common law that exists
today.
So what you would have if you established a rule, whatever the rule
would be-I am not even talking about the content of the rule right
now-is a rule that would govern one aspect of inadvertent disclosure,
the aspect that occurs during discovery. There would be a conflict, no
question about it, with some common law somewhere-with some
federal common law somewhere -that deals with this second-tier kind
of disclosure outside of the discovery situation. I don't see how that is
beneficial to any practitioner or any court.
Further, this rule would not apply to criminal cases. There is a good
number of cases in which inadvertent disclosure occurs in criminal
cases. It has happened to the government in the Southern District of
New York, I think, four or five times. This rule, I assume, cannot
cover that.
So you are not dealing with basically all of the problem, and if
you're not dealing with all of the problem, what results is a
balkanization of the law. To me, therefore, the only thing that can be
done if you really want to regulate this area is to have an Evidence
Rule, because an Evidence Rule deals with whether the information is
admissible at a trial. That governs criminal cases, that governs civil
cases, that governs the missent fax cases.
But, unfortunately, there will never be an Evidence Rule on this
issue, and the reason for that is because we know that it would modify
a privilege, and we wouldn't propose it because we know that
Congress-it's kind of a circular thing. There will never be an
Evidence Rule on this point.
So I realize that it's a knotty problem, but I don't think that it can
be solved by a civil rule.
Finally, just in passing, if the Committee is going to deal with what
has been called "inadvertent disclosure" or "inadvertent waiver," the
language that is proposed-it is really not a waiver when you think
about it, it's a forfeiture. Judge Posner has a long disquisition on the
difference between waivers and forfeitures. 6
But just speaking in an elementary sense, a waiver is an intentional
relinquishment of a known right, and this is not what is happening
with an inadvertent disclosure.
It's a forfeiture. The reason it is considered a forfeiture is because
counsel has done something that disentitles counsel from invoking the
privilege. That's what a forfeiture is. So I submit that this is a
forfeiture rule, not a waiver rule.
PROF. COOPER: What Dan has just proved is that we cannot get
6. See United States v. Richardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841-42 (7th Cir. 2001).
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away from the style project. One of the many fights I have lost was
the effort to substitute "forfeit" for "waive" throughout the Rules for
precisely the reason that Dan has just given.
PROF. CAPRA: I did not know this. He did not brief me on this.
PROF. COOPER: You can't escape it.
MS. BIRNBAUM: But he wasn't any more successful than you
have been.
PROF. COOPER: The word down the line is that Jonathan wants
to respond.
MR. REDGRAVE: Yes, that's correct.
I disagree with respect to what the Rules Committee could do if it
so chose with respect to the inadvertent waiver. You can substitute
other words, but certainly the case law has developed with the concept
of waiver in mind for the privilege and the rights.
We have procedural rules that affect substantive rights. That's just
what they do, they affect substantive rights. Do they create or do they
destroy the privilege rights? I think that's what you need to look at.
And I think you can craft a rule that sets forth ways in which
privilege claims can be made, sets forth ways in which parties can go
about situations where mistakes happen and what do you do to return
a document, to adjudicate any challenges to the privilege, and do that
all within the purview of the procedural rules and not run afoul of the
Rules Enabling Act.7
PROF. CAPRA: I need to respond to that, because the issue is not
whether it is procedural or not. That's a misnomer. The issue is
whether it "modifies a privilege," that's the statutory language, so
getting into issues of whether it is substantive or procedureMR. REDGRAVE: You're not modifying the privilege if you do it
right. You are affecting the way in which a person claims a privilege.
And right now on privilege logging requirements, if you don't turn in
a timely privilege log, a court can say, "you're toast." Well, that was a
procedure. Putting forth the defense of that privilege was set forth by
a procedure by the court under Rule 26(b)(5).8 If you didn't follow
the procedure, you lost your right. Well, are you saying then we can't
even have that?
It's a procedure that affects the substantive right. It is not
changing/modifying that right, the existence of that privilege, but that
procedure. That's why I say we can look at a rule and discuss a rule,
but you've got to be very careful in drafting that rule not to create,
modify, or destroy a right that otherwise exists in the common law of
the states or the federal common law.
MS. BIRNBAUM: Can I just add also?

7. § 2071.
8. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).
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The fact, Dan, that I think we are looking at this only through a
discovery prism rather than criminal law, evidentiary, admissibility,
etc., I think that also is very limiting. It's not wrong, because I think
what the attempt is to try to do is to solve a problem that is creating
enormous costs, inefficiencies, time consumption, that can be resolved
in a way that says if I do this quick-and we'll talk about the "quick
peek"-and I get my papers to Lieff Cabraser's office earlier, I'm not
going to be punished for that. I'm helping my client, hopefully-it's
costing them less. I'm taking a risk, but by taking that risk and getting
this done in an efficient, cost-effective way, I don't want to lose my
privilege -otherwise, I can't do it.
So I think that you can separate this discovery issue from perhaps
all the other issues that you are concerned about.
PROF. COOPER: What that does is get us directly into the second
wave of this panel.
MS. BIRNBAUM: We planned this.
PROF. COOPER: Well, we planned it because Sheila is the one I
am going to call on first.
The generic set of questions is: Well, supposing that in their
imperious wisdom the Committees decide that, yes, there is something
that may be within the process that would perhaps have to be
transmitted to Congress, with the advice that the Supreme Court
thinks this is § 2072 and not § 2074(b), 9 and that would lie down the
road. How far would any one of a number of the suggested
How far would a lawyer
approaches actually change practice?
protected by a claw-back or a "quick peek" or some other approach in
fact be able to reduce the screening time, their screening cost?
One approach has the benefit of being an actual real-life rule, is the
Texas Rule. This is 193.3(d)."0 That provides protection against
The comment to it suggests that it provides
privilege waiver.
protection even if the party who produced was not diligent in seeking
to protect the privilege. 1" The comment is a very rich source of
information about this. I commend it to you because it addresses
another real problem that may arise.
But, Sheila-and this may come as a surprise to you-has some
experience with the Texas Rule and might be the first to comment on
it.
MS. BIRNBAUM: Thank you.
The Texas Rule goes far beyond electronic discovery and far
beyond just discovery. It would fit into all categories, and I think that
makes it broader than what may be discussed by the Committee.

9. See §§ 2072, 2074(b).
10. Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.3
11. Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.3 advisory committee's notes.
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What it provides is-and it takes away the word "inadvertent," by
the way, which is probably a good thing at this point, because it talks
about "without intending. 1

2

It says,

A party who produces material or information without intending to
waive a claim of privilege does not waive that claim under these
rules or the Rules of Evidence if-within ten days, or a shorter time
ordered by the court, after the producing party actually discovers
that such production is made-the producing party amends the
response, identifying the material or information produced and
stating the privilege asserted. If the producing party thus amends the
response to assert a privilege, the requesting party must promptly
any copies pending
return the specified material or information and
13
any ruling by the court denying the privilege.
Actually we are in a case which was hotly contested on discovery. I
mean there were eight sanctions motions pending at one time, all over
discovery, and all of course going in one direction. There was an
inadvertently produced clear attorney-client privileged document.
This took effect immediately and the document was returned
immediately and it never went to court to determine whether it was an
attorney-client privilege because it clearly was an attorney-client
privilege. So I have seen this work, and work well, in a case where
nobody was giving quarter to any other person in the litigation.
I think it does several things if you have something like this. People
can spend less time and money in doing this. Now, in hotly contested
cases people are going to do a privilege review because there really is
a concern that some document is going to get out and you can't either
put the bag over the child's head or un-ring a bell. In those kinds of
litigations, that's the parties' choice to spend the money if they want
to do that.
But if we had something that made it easier, and everybody knew
what the rule was and it was clear, I think people in many instances
would do either a "quick peek" which will look at that, or spend less
time and money doing it, because they knew if they made a mistake
they were going to get it back, and it would help the process, at least
to some extent.
MR. SAVERI: Excuse me. One of the problems, though, I have
with the Texas Rule is that it eliminates this diligence requirement. I
think that diligence is important because, after all, the material we are
talking about is relevant, it is otherwise discoverable, but we have
decided that there is another reason for not making it part of the
adjudicative process.
I have a real concern if the privileged information just comes to
light at trial. You know, how does that affect the parties' rights who
12. Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.3(d).
13. Id.
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have spent the money, prepared for trial, and then all of a sudden this
document comes out and they say, "Well, despite the fact that we
really didn't pay much attention and we weren't diligent, the Rule
says we get it back"? Now we have to do all sorts of things to try to
un-ring that bell, and I think that is potentially unfair to the parties.
PROF. COOPER: This is another wonderful advertisement for a
sort of Reporter's secret part of the rule process, and that is look at
the Committee Note. The Comment to the Texas Rule addresses
that.14 The question, Joseph, is, what do you think about this
provision in it?
What it says is, "To avoid complications at trial, a party may
identify prior to trial the documents intended to be offered, thereby
triggering the obligation to assert any overlooked privilege under this
rule. A trial court may also order this procedure."15
In effect, it changes the burden to you've got the thing now and the
way you can protect yourself against that trial surprise is list before
trial every document you intend to use at trial.
PROF. CAPRA: But there is no question that's not to be in a
Committee Note, that's to be in the Rule.
There is another problem with the Rule. Another problem with the
Rule is that it basically puts a burden on the receiving party of having
to show that any argument that they make, any pleading that they
amend, any witness that they call, is not derived from privileged
information.
But I assume that means you cannot use the fruits as well. The
Rule doesn't actually say that, but I assume that that's the ordinary
rule. So how do you deal with fruits in this situation? You've invited
a fruits argument in every case.
MS. BIRNBAUM: I've never seen the fruits argument made, but I
guess it's a good one, because I think what really happens in real life is
the document is given back. Usually the document is not an
important document. I mean usually it isn't the crucial document, that
one and only smoking gun document. So as a practical matter, it may
in some instances be important, but that's the rare case.
PROF. CAPRA: I was involved in a case where a law firm
disclosed inadvertently part of Board minutes at which said firm gave
some advice. It got turned over to the plaintiff. The plaintiff read it,
turned it back because it was found to be an inadvertent disclosure
under the six- or eight-factor Inadvertent Disclosure Rule that that
court was applying at that particular time, and then the plaintiff
The defendant moved to strike the
amended the complaint.
amendment. The plaintiff argued, "I could deduce this change of fact
through otherwise ordinary channels." The judge spent maybe about
14. Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.3 advisory committee's notes.
15. Id.
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six months trying to figure that out. So that's how the fruits
arguments come up-and that's under current law, and that's not even
under the Texas Rule.
PROF. COOPER: Okay. We've got to keep this moving.
Lawyers often stipulate to a protective order that provides a sort of
two-step process: the first step is the requesting party looks at
everything, identifies what is typically a quite small fraction of the
total of potentially responsive material that it is actually interested in,
and then the producing party screens and the discovery process goes
on.
There may be some thought that something like that could reduce
to some extent those concerns about where within the Enabling Act
process that fits. Is it something that comes too close to modifying a
privilege?
Jonathan Redgrave, you have some thoughts about "quick peek"
and some experience. What do you think of it?
MR. REDGRAVE: Well, I do have some thoughts on the "quick
peek" approach.
Before I lose my train of thought on the last discussion, though, I
just want to throw out two things.
You heard something about the balkanization. I'm not sure I fully
like that term as best to describe what goes on in this world as far as
inadvertent production or how you deal with privilege issues on a
"quick peek" approach or whatever.
But the reality is you've got a variety of approaches being employed
by various federal courts all throughout the country, whether a
standing local rule now says "you've got to discuss it," or judges have
their nice little "in their back pocket" order, so they go out there. So
it is an inconsistent practice already, and the idea behind a rule would
be bring some consistency to that.
Secondly-and this is just a thought to throw out there; I'd be
happy to discuss it with anyone later-I think Rule 2616 is a much
better place for any inadvertent production rule, because you would
try to get it to the broadest possible application to the discovery
process. I think you see in the Texas Rule, and I'm not an expert on
the Texas Rule, but it's in the Discovery Rules generally, so it applies
to all the discovery exchanges.
I think that is better than just Rule 3417 because, as my intro into the
"quick peek" approach, my practice is much like the game I bought
for my kids, the worst case scenario game. I don't know if any of you
have done this. It tells you how to run away from killer bees, it tells
you how to kill a rattlesnake. And I guess now I know the question of
how to kill a copperhead, so I'm ahead of my kids when I next play it.
16. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
17. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
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But the reality is I have seen an argument in the case where we had
a privilege log where we inadvertently turned over the attorney
comment field as well as the other privilege log fields on a database.
The other side said, "Well, that wasn't a Rule 34, so your non-waiver
order doesn't apply. Ha, ha, we get to keep it." Well, we litigated it.
We won, but we had to litigate it at great cost.
So I think Rule 26 is a better place for it, to just be as broad as
possible within what the Rules can do.
Now the "quick peek." I don't know how many of you understand
what this is, so I am going to take two seconds to explain it.
Instead of doing this privilege review, I will say to you that I've got
a large set of backup tapes. I've loaded them on the computer. I will
ask you whether you want to see all the e-mails. I'm going to bring
you into a room and I'm going to let you see it. I haven't pulled
anyone out. The general counsel e-mail is on there, all the employees'
e-mail. It would cost me millions of dollars to go through it. I will tell
you that the case should be simple. I'm going to let you come in, you
can spend ten days, you go through it, and at the end of the ten days I
am going to now go through what you've selected and that's where
I'm going to focus my money. If you selected some privileged
documents, I'm going to put them on a privilege log.
Is this a good idea? Is this a good idea? And, even if it is a good
idea, will anyone out there actually do it?
Back to the worst case scenario game, I have actually been in a case
where someone has done it. The opposing party did this with respect
to both paper production and an electronic production of e-mails. I'm
not sure they'd do it again, but quite frankly I don't think they
actually ran a waiver risk, I don't think they had a bad experience with
it, and it allowed them to save millions of dollars in discovery costs
because they didn't have to review it. And the number of documents
we actually selected from that process was very few.
But the problem in this is that lowest common denominator again.
Remember? We could have a rule that says "'quick peek' is great in
the federal courts" and there's this non-waiver concept, but as long as
you have other jurisdictions in states or territories that say, look, we're
not going to recognize that. The bell has rung. You can't ignore the
child in the bag. It's over, you've waived it, and I don't care if this
quirky "quick peek" thing was adopted by the Federal Rules. We
don't follow that here in this state and you're done.
So until there is absolute assurance, you've still got the client saying,
"Well, there's this risk, and if the document gets out there I still need
to spend the money." We're trying to untie that Gordian knot,
because what Sheila very well explained is that in this privilege review
process it is very hard to explain to associates how to find privilege.
And the electronic age has made it worse, because what used to be
maybe the memo to the client reflecting the client's request for legal
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advice and then the attorney responding to that request, the prima
facie privilege-now, the e-mails go back and forth, the associate
picks up the e-mail in the middle of the string, how do you know it's
privileged? You've got to do all the contextual research. It is very
difficult. So I submit it is getting more and more expensive to do this,
and as a result of the volume I think your privilege logs are getting
worse.
Now, with that, if you were to adopt a "quick peek" approach, I
think it should be something that is just a voluntary matter. In our
case, the party voluntarily said, "We want to do this to save the
money," and then entered into the restrictions for both sides with
respect to their review. I think, given the uncertainty and the fact that
you can't give an absolute assurance with regard to waiver, it would be
a mistake to make this a mandatory event, and I think it would also be
a mistake to have it out there in the Rules in such a way that a judge
feels that they could put a lot of pressure on the party to get the case
to trial-"We need to do this regardless of your privilege."
Now, I say that, and I realize a lot of jurisdictions have rocket
dockets and there are a lot of pressures and sometimes you need to do
creative things to get the case to trial.
Last thing on the "quick peek" approach. If you do this-and I
don't think the rule would necessarily reflect it, and obviously I'm
hearing a lot of things, that the comments aren't going to say anything
except "we discussed something and we're not going to tell you what
it was"-you've got to have a very strict review process whereby there
are no notes taken, and you completely guard as best you can against
the bell anyone ever being able to remember what the bell sounded
like. And I think you really can do that.
And it's sad. We had a lot of associates and other people review
this production on this "quick peek" approach. If I ask people who
were there-I mean they couldn't talk to us about what they saw; all
we got was a privilege log-we actually got a non-responsive log, if
you can believe that, and we got the other documents, the responsive
non-privileged documents. If I ask people now what they saw, they
don't know. I mean that bell has long faded in the forest.
PROF. COOPER: I simply first observe that "quick peek" as
described could be modified as "quick peek lite"-that is, you would
clearly remove everything that was manifestly privileged or otherwise
protectable before you entered the "quick peek" process, and of
course log it. So it doesn't have to be all or nothing.
Another approach that is also described in the materials is to
suggest that, well, one thing rules can do-and indeed it is often
supposed that the soundest rules are those that build on welldeveloped practice, bringing regularity and uniformity to things the
courts have been doing for some time, trying out and working out-is
take a look at what courts are doing now about inadvertent privilege

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

waiver, recognizing that this would likely test still further the line
between a discovery-only civil rule and a broader evidentiary rule.
PROF. CAPRA: I would like to note something. A seven- or
eight-factor test in a rule makes no sense to me. Why would you have
a Rule like that?
For one thing, most courts in the United States have such a rule, but
some are five-factor tests, some are eight-factor tests, some are sevenfactor tests. So you are going to change, I guess, the law in all of those
jurisdictions except for the one that you codify, I guess, even if you do
that.
Secondly, whenever you add the "interest of justice," you might as
well just forget about any kind of balancing test at all. If you've read
any of these cases, it was totally not diligent, it was a lot of
information, the person was an innocent bystander, but the interest of
justice required it to be returned. All factors point against return, but
the interest of justice-okay, you know.
So how do you write it? Writing a rule is not going to regulate
courts in this way. They've got their own multi-factor balancing tests
as they exist. It just doesn't seem to me to be appropriate for
rulemaking.
PROF. COOPER: Joseph?
MR. SAVERI: I guess the question is whether you set forth the
factors or you just allow as a general matter that there will be these
kinds of protections for inadvertent production. I think you get to the
same place.
I think in any event judges can handle this and I think it would beI mean it has a lot of benefits for the system. I don't care if it's a fivefactor test or an eight-factor test or a two-factor test. I think there
should be some test, and I think there should be some rule that
permits it. I think everybody would benefit from it.
MR. REDGRAVE: I would just add on that obviously Rule
26(b)(2)(i), (ii), (iii) sets forth a three-factor test,18 but under 26(c) you
set forth a number of other factors for protective orders. 9 I don't
think the fact that there may be a test that you set forth that has
different factors should be a deciding factor on whether or not this is a
good idea or a bad idea. If it is determined that it is a good idea for
uniformity, it falls within the Rules Enabling Act, I'd go ahead and
see if you can come up with a factors test that could help all the
courts.

18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).

